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Military Disgrace? 
Political writer Norman C. Miller recently 
used that caption, without the question mark, 
in a Wall Street Journal article describing the 
status of  the volunteer army. Miller claims 
that the military is beset by "dangerous 
manpower shortages and deficiencies," and 
official Washington apparently agrees with 
him. Under new legislation, 4 million young 
men will begin crowding the nation's post 
offices next week to register for a potential 
draft -suggesting a failure of  the volunteer-
army concept which had been initiated with 
so much fanfare in 1973. Although allocating 
22 percent of its $138  .. 6-billion budgetthis 
year for active-duty personnel, the Admini-
stration apparently believes that it lacks the 
strength to carry out the nation's military 
. objectives throughout the world. 
The manpower statistics are not very 
reassuring. The size of the active-duty force 
has declined steadily, and now stands at 2.0 
million, compared with 2.3 million at the 
creation of the all-volunteer force. Most 
major units today are considerably below 
their authorized strength. More important-
ly, the armed services have experienced 
qualitative as well as quantitative shortfalls 
in manpower resources. About 62 percent 
of male Army recruits have not completed 
high school, and one-fourth of that group 
read at the sixth-grade level or below. 
The quality problem is aggravated by the 
difficulty of retaining qualified people. 
About 30 percent of males enlisting do not 
even complete their first term of enlistment. 
Retention rates for third termers-people 
with roughly 11  years' service-now av-
erage less than 70 percent. Most of  those 
who leave possess critically needed skills, 
such as submarine technicians, electronics 
technicians, air-traffic controllers, and 
computer programmers. 
Broken commitment 
The evidence thus appears to support the 
argument that the volunteer-army concept 
has failed. But those who make that argument 
ignore a key conclusion of the President's 
Commission on the All-Volunteer Force (the 
Gates Commission), which a decade ago set 
forth the basic economic requirement of a 
volunteer army: "The viability of an all-
volunteer force ultimately depends on the 
willingness of Congress, the President, the 
Department of Defense, and the services to 
maintain competitive levels of military pay." 
To meet that commitment, Congress restruc-
tured military-pay schedules prior to the 
adoption of an all-volunteer force in 1973. 
But today, military pay schedules are not 
competitive. 
In 1972, the average pay of military personnel 
equalled 98 percent of the average pay in all 
industries. Today, military pay amounts to 
only 85 percent of all-industry pay, reflecting 
a 14-percentdecline (in real terms) in military 
pay since 1972 (see chart). That ratio is con-
siderably lower today than it was in 1939, 
when the nation had a smaI1400,000-man -
volunteerforce, and also in 1945, when the 
nation fielded a large corscript army of 11.4 
million people. (The gap has widened even 
more between civilian government pay and 
military pay.) In contrast, retirement-pay 
schedules are relatively generous by civilian 
standards, providing for (indexed) half-pay 
after 20 years. 
Former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, in a 
recent report to Congress, noted that the 
average compensation for an enlisted person 
(including pay and allowances) amounted 
last year to $9,900 - 14 percent below the 
minimum amount necessary to maintain a 
"lower" standard of living for a family of  four. 
The basic pay for all personnel in grades E-l 
to E-4 -that  is, roughly one-third of the en-
tire enlisted force -falls at or below the 
minimum-wage. Differentials are even more 
pronounced in certain high-skill areas. Mid-
career, non-commissioned officers earn 
.  about $12,000 a year as computer pro-1t: 
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grammers or electronics technicians, but as 
civilians they could earn twice that much. 
Laird cites the case of  an E-4 plane handler on 
the nuclear carrier Nimitz, deployed on the 
Indian Ocean, who normally works 16 hours 
a day or about 100 hours per week. In the 
course of his duties, he handles F-14 aircraft 
(which cost $25 million per plane) and he 
helps operate a $2-billion ship -yet  he 
makes less per hour  than a cashier at McDon-
ald's, lives below the poverty level, is eligible 
. for food stamps, and probably has not seen 
his family for six months or more. 
Costs: voh  .. u1Iteers vs. draftees 
To meet the standard set by the Gates Com-
mission will take a considerable amount of 
money-roughly $111,12  billion a year, in 
Laird's view. For example, $5 billion would 
be needed to restore military pay to its 1972 
real-income level-considerably more than 
1980's 12-percent scheduled raise. Another 
$2 billion would be needed to provide annu-
al special-skill pay to those enlisted and offi-
cer ratings where severe shortages now exist. 
However, there wou  Id be compensati ng ben-
efits. Forexample, about $2 billion per year is 
now needed to recruit, train, separate, and 
pay benefits to individuals who do not com-
plete their first term -in  addition to the costs 
that the government incurs in unemployment 
compensation for such military dropouts. 
Faced with the cost increases needed to re-
store the viability of a volunteer army, many 
congressmen may be tempted to reimpose 
conscription as a cheaper alternative-
although even that course would not solve 
the drain of experienced personnel. But 
strong differences of opinion exist regarding 
the draft itself. William H. Meckling, Dean of 
the University of Rochester's Graduate 
School of  Management and former Executive 
Director of  the Gates Commission, argues 
that a conscript force costs society substan-
tially more than a volunteerforce. In his view, 
if  the military takes a volunteer, it draws from 
that part of  the supply curve of people for 
whom being in the military is an attractive 
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occupation. That costs society very little. In 
contrast, conscription takes people from all 
along the supply curve. In a recent Fortune 
interview, Meckling argues that society in-
curs heavy costs when physicists are put to 
work swabbing down the decks of ships. 
Moreover, says Meckling, "When you have a 
conscript force, instead of taxing the general 
public to get the right kind of people to vol-
unteer, you are levying a high tax on the very 
small subset of  the population that you draft./I 
According to the Gates Commission's statis-
tics, draftees and draft-induced volunteers 
incur an effective tax rate of more than 50 
percent, mostiy in the form of foregone earn-
ings, compared to the 10-percent tax rate 
paid by individuals who are not drafted. 
Filling the gap: demographics 
Supporters of a volunteer army may be cor-
rect in their belief  that more funds will help fill 
the ranks of  the armed forces, but that task 
will be complicated by adverse demographic 
factors throughout the 1980s. In the mid-
1970s, maintaining a volunteer force of 2.1 
million active-duty personnel meant that 
roughly one-third of all qualified and avail-
able (non-college) men volunteered for ac-
tive military service before age 23. This ratio 
wou  Id have to rise during the present decade, 
however, because of a 19-percent decline in 
the population of males in the 17-22 age 
category between 1979 and 1989. Specifi-
cally, male accession requirements would 
shift from a ratio of 1/2.9 in 1975-80 to a ratio 
of only 1/2.3 in the 1985-90 period. 
The one-third ratio could be restored, how-
ever, by reducing demands on the pool of 
qualified and available males, and also by 
increasing the supply of possible candidates. 
For example, demands on that key man-
power pool could be reduced by 84,000 
through several measures -such as in-
creasi ng the ratio of women mil  itary per-
sonne to 15 percent of  total strength, 
reducing the attrition of  first-termers by 20 
percent, or utilizing more civilians in military 
positions. At the same time, the manpower $000 
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supply could be increased by perhaps 
32,000, by attracting 5 percent of third-and 
fourth-year college students into the armed 
services, or by relaxing weight standards by 
about 10 percent. 
Filling the gap: management 
More basically, the success of a volunteer 
army depends upon the military establish-
ment's ability to adjust its management tech-
niques to a new environment. For a lengthy 
period - 1940 to 1972 -the  system of con-
scription encouraged the military to develop 
and maintain patterns of manpower utiliza-
tion that are no longer cost effective. But the 
cost of manpower has risen substantially rel-
ative to the cost of  capital equ ipment over the 
past decade, so that military managers are 
now being forced to find ways of substituting 
equipment for manpower, especially in sup-
port activities. Additionally, they are being 
forced to improve resource allocation by 
changing the experience-mix of the military 
force. Because offirst-term pay increases and 
recruiting costs, the cost of first-term per-
sonnel has increased dramatically relative to 
the cost of career personnel. Thus, shifting 
from the current mix of 60 percent first-
termers and 40 percent careerists to (say) a 
55-45 percent mix could yield substantial 
cost savi ngs -even though it wou  Id requ i  re 
some reallocation of funds to career 
personnel. 
Funds for boosting active-duty pay also could 
be obtained through changes in the military-
retirement system. Retirement costs represent 
the largest and fastest-growing component of 
manpower spending, having increased from 
$1/2 billion in the mid-1950s to more than 
$10 billion in 1979, and perhaps to $18 
billion by 1983. (Atthat point, retirement 
costs would equal roughly 60 percent of  the 
cost of the active-duty force.) The actuarial 
cost of the current system adds between 40 
and 55 percent to the regular military com-
pensation of those who retire, whereas the 
contribution for standard private-retirement 
programs is between 5 and 20 percent of 
salaries and wages. In any event, retirement 
costs will continue to be a heavy drain on the 
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defense budget, so long as service personnel 
continue to retire after only 20 years at half-
pay, with that amount indexed to increases in 
active-duty pay. 
Reliance on a volunteer army also could lead 
to substantial changes in military planning. In 
a Congressional debate last year, Senator 
Gary Hart argued for a change in the ratio of 
combat-power to manpower, to parallel the 
ratios maintained by foreign armies. The total 
Army division "slice" -the  number of per-
sonnel required to man and support each 
division -is  now over 40,000 men. But ifthe 
Army could achieve a division slice of  25,000 
men -roughly the average for our NATO 
allies -we  could field our current 19-
division equivalent with 475,000 men, thus 
generating a saving of about 300,000. 
Bearing the burden 
In the growing debate over the nation's mil-
itary strength, no one has disputed the facts 
about the declining relative share of  the mil-
itary in the national economy. Between 1970 
and 1979, the defense portion of  GNP 
dropped from 8.4 percentto 5.1 percent, and 
the military portion of  the labor force  . 
dropped from 3.7 to 2.1  percent. Perhaps for 
that reason, a broad consensus has devel-
oped favoring the Administration's call for a 
25-percent spending increase (in real terms) 
for the military over the next half-decade. 
The major argument, as we have seen, has 
centered around the question of  who will 
bear the burden of  the nation's growing 
military-personnel requirements-a rela-
tively small nwmber of young workers, or the 
general taxpayer. In this controversy, the 
Gates Commission's economic arguments for 
an all-volunteer force have yet to be dis-
proved. Indeed, we have witnessed in the 
past half-decade a textbook illustration of  the 
workings of economic incentives and disin-
centives -with a sharp rise in military pay 
bringing about a satisfactory labor-supply sit-
uation in the mid-1970s, and a sharp decline 
in real wages creating an unsatisfactory sit-
uation today. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and liabilities 
Large Commercial Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total  # 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves ( +  )/Deficiency (  - ) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves ( +  )/Net borrowed(  - ) 
*  Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
7,723  6.0 
8,883  8.3 
2,219  7.1 
7,961  20.7 
1,253  5.6 
805  !- 45.8 
1,397  - 18.3 
237  1.6 
2,021  - 4.3 
1,191  - 3.7 
2,239  - 7.4 
11,439  22.4 
11,638  27.4 
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